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ABSTRACT 
The cases discussed in this paper concern new situations in health care which 
demonstrate the inadequacy of traditional models of bioethics.  I propose that an 
analysis informed by Levinasian conceptions of the Other will yield a richer critique and 
one which will do greater justice to a Christian vision of health care and of persons as 
the subjects and participants in health care.  The contribution of Levinas in this analysis 
is three-fold: identifying features of the cases that would normally go un-noticed or 
unexamined; highlighting the importance relational perspectives in health care; and, 
prioritizing the Other in all ethical deliberations.  These perspectives are vital in the 
construction of a practical theology of health care based on relationality. 
 
 
*     *     *     *     * 
 
In this paper I first outline the cases to be examined that of Nancy Crick and Terri 
Schiavo both reasonably high profile end-of-life cases.  The initial presentation of the 
cases is simply the factual outline – much as would occur in any study of a bioethical 
case.  In fact, presented in this way the cases are relatively unremarkable.  However, I 
argue that they herald a significant change in health care.  Where traditional bioethics 
focuses on the licitness, the rightness and wrongness of actions and the role of health 
care professionals – usually a physician.  A relational paradigm in health care leads to 
different kinds of analysis, different issues being highlighted and potentially different 
outcomes.  It certainly informs a quite different theological contribution. 
 
Following the presentation of the cases the next two sections of the paper, exploring the 
need for a new ethic in health care and the development of a relational analysis of the 
cases.  In this way I draw out other features which are not included in the bare facts of 
the case but which demonstrate the significance of relational perspectives.  Finally, I 
argue for a practical theology of health care drawing on the insights of Emmanuel 
Levinas. 
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The Cases: 
 
Nancy Crick 
Nancy Crick was a 70 year old Australian widow who lived with one of her sons, in close 
proximity to other members of her family.  We know a good deal about her perceptions since 
she kept and published a web diary chronicling her experience.  In 1999 she underwent surgery 
for bowel cancer.  Following surgery she continued to experience discomfort, pain, nausea and 
vomiting.  As a result of the surgery she had a colostomy, a bag that functions as a collection 
receptacle for faeces.1  Nancy determined that she would end her own life when her efforts to 
seek medical assistance to die were deemed to be unlawful.  Over a period of time she sought 
advice from health care professionals and determined her preferred option was to end her life. 
Her public campaign to have voluntary euthanasia/physician assisted suicide legalised included 
media interviews and an internet diary.  Crick refused further investigative or alleviative surgery; 
found the palliative care regime that was trialled less than satisfactory; and continued in pain 
and discomfort.  Crick ended her life on May 22, 2002 using barbiturates sent to her through the 
mail.  Following Crick’s death an autopsy confirmed what she had been previously told by 
physicians: she was free of cancer.  It also revealed that her bowel was twisted, which had been 
suggested as a probable cause of her symptoms.  It has also been suggested that her body 
weight was not 27 kilograms as claimed but nearly double that and that she was gaining weight, 
presumably following a more appropriate care regime instituted during her final hospital 
admission.2 
 
 
Terri Schiavo 
Terri Schiavo, a Florida woman collapsed in 1990 due to a suspected potassium imbalance 
which caused a heart attack and temporarily cut-off the supply of oxygen to her brain.  She was 
subsequently diagnosed with hypoxic encephalopathy.  Following initial treatment Schiavo was 
able to breathe unassisted but did require artificial means of nutrition and hydration.  From 2000 
her husband began attempts to cease nutrition and hydration; the various legal battles finally 
concluded in 2005 ruling that her husband could request the hospital to cease artificial nutrition 
and hydration.  Terri Schiavo died on March 31, 2005.  
 
Physicians argued that Schiavo exhibited eyes open permanent unconsciousness with 
physiological sleep/wake cycles.  Her parents, in contrast, held that she was conscious, though 
with some form of brain damage which had obvious physical effects. The precise extent of her 
neurological damage was never completely ascertained while she was alive.  It should be noted 
that while definitive diagnosis of the extent of brain damage was limited, there was medical 
consensus that given the severity of the damage and the length of time which had elapsed, 
Schiavo had little chance of recovery, in the sense of a return to her previous life or even 
substantial improvement.  An autopsy confirmed this diagnosis and also that many of the claims 
of her parents about “eye-tracking” and some spontaneous eating when offered food, were 
highly unlikely to be accurate. 
 
 
The Need for a New Health Care Ethic: 
 
It can be argued that the discipline of bioethics has emerged as a means of guiding 
health care professionals in the wake of abuses and in reaction to new technologies and 
procedures.  Yet, as health care in the Western world has evolved, these twin 
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approaches are increasingly inadequate.  George Khushf, addressing the problem of 
evil, illness and the structures of healing, argues that illness is deeply revelatory.  It 
discloses our radical dependency on the Other.  He tellingly remarks: 
 
Through illness individuals become aware of their insufficiency and they turn to 
others for help.  However, most people do not appreciate the full revelatory 
function of illness – that it discloses a deep brokenness that is there already, and 
not brought about for the first time by the sickness.  Instead, people think of the 
dis-integration of self and the alienation from community and God as a 
consequence of sickness, rather than as something unveiled in and by sickness.3 
 
The cases examined here are acute examples of Khushf’s point.  Nancy Crick and Terri 
Schiavo reveal humanity’s intrinsic vulnerability and the need for a relational perspective 
in health care practice.  It is here that Levinas offers the possibility of new 
understandings. 
 
A starting point for relational perspectives in health care is simply to take account of 
patients’ life-orientation and the mythic conception of life’s meaning and purpose.  Joel 
Shuman argues that where no account of this is taken the medical outcomes are 
routinely adversely affected.4  His reference to his own grandfather’s experience is 
instructive.  The old man, after being diagnosed with a terminal condition, was removed 
from the isolated rural community where he had spent his entire life.  He was taken 
several hundred miles away to a major medical institution for palliative treatment, with 
unfortunate results.  Shuman argues that the moral harm done to his grandfather 
resulted, not from any deliberate intent or medical incompetence, but from a generalised 
failure of the health care system—what he describes as a “fundamental inability to know 
and to care for its patients.”5  At its heart, it is an inability to allow the patient as other to 
remain Other.  The patient in this case had been encouraged to believe that the “world 
of the physicians”, that is, the clinical setting, was worthy of trust in terms of his care 
and treatment; this trust was then betrayed: 
That trust had no real basis in a commonly held, deliberatively arrived at vision of what it 
might have meant for my grandfather to live well for the remainder of his life…6 
 
Those caring for Shuman’s grandfather focused on what they could do for their patient, 
instead of what their patient needed: 
 
 4
…for though my grandfather’s physicians knew as much as there was to know 
about his disease, they seem to have been totally oblivious–and in their minds, 
perhaps not unjustifiably–to the things that really made him the person he was – 
a simple man of remarkable character, with deep attachments to work and land 
and family, who had lived an exceptional life and who deserved a death 
consistent with that life.7 
 
Levinas would support Shuman’s concerns.  In rejecting traditional metaphysics and 
epistemology to focus on the one-to-one human relationships he argues are archetypal 
for all relations—that is, the face-to-face encounters between persons.  Commenting on 
the face of the Other, he writes,   
 
The first thing which is evident in the face of the other is this rectitude of 
exposure and defencelessness.  In his face, the human being is most naked, 
destitution itself.  And at the same time, he faces.  It is a manner in which he is 
completely alone in his facing us that we measure the violence perpetrated in 
death.  Third moment of the epiphany of the face: it makes a demand on me.  
The face looks at me and calls me.  It lays claim to me.8 
 
The physicians treating Shuman’s grandfather clearly have not encountered the old 
man’s face.  In the face, the Other is stripped bare in a vulnerability that cannot be 
hidden.  It calls forth immediately an ethical response, as “the face looks at me and calls 
me”.  Ultimately, this claim is, “do not kill me”.9  An essential asymmetry is involved in 
this kind of relationship.  There is a kind of primordial fear present as the self faces the 
possibility of being negated by the Other.  In the field of health care this asymmetry has 
particular resonance and rejection does involve facing death.  But the apprehension in 
the presence of the Other, when it does not turn back on itself, becomes the basis for 
responsibility to and for the Other. 
 
As our capacity for some improved health outcomes increases the dilemmas facing us 
also grow.  These dilemmas demonstrate the inadequacy of the previous bioethical 
formulae in the same way that Levinas found traditional metaphysics and epistemology 
wanting.  In its place and utilizing Levinas’ thought I propose a relational analysis of 
such situations in health care. 
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A Relational Analysis 
Nancy Crick’s web diary is an eloquent testimony to her loneliness, isolation and 
suffering.  Those who assisted her in coming to the decision to end her life and 
supported her in that decision reinforced, or reflected back, those feelings.  Despite the 
“community” which gathered around her to witness her death, she saw herself as an 
isolated individual who could no longer sustain a sense of self sufficient to continue in 
life.  Understanding herself to be a person-in-relation may have altered the outcome.  
Those who promoted her cause failed to express her vulnerability in this regard.  For 
purposes of their own, they championed the cause of the individual fundamentally 
separated from all other persons, and for whom any decision has no impact on the lives 
and being of others.  The argument offered by those supporting Crick’s choice to end 
her life moved from the narrow case of voluntary euthanasia to the acceptability of a 
personal choice to end one’s life at anytime, for any reason.  This makes a certain 
degree of sense if persons are simply individuals who happen to exist within a social 
context; it is not meaningful, however, if the relational aspect of personhood is included.  
Nancy Crick’s web-diary,10 the video tape she made in order to present her own 
views,11 and some of the commentaries on her choices,12 all reinforce the view that she 
understood her life and her personhood in purely functional terms. 
 
Crick wrote in the web-diary that when she postponed her death from 10 April, 2002 she 
received a number of hostile messages from some who previously supported her, 
indicating that she was failing the Voluntary Euthanasia cause.  She notes that her 
supporters have become critics precisely because she was not doing exactly what they 
wanted her to do.  Her justification for postponing her euthanasia was that she needed 
to explore palliative options in order to meet the objections of those who oppose 
euthanasia.13  Throughout the process the diary increasingly reflects her view that her 
death serves the cause: 
 
I am honoured to be called a torch-bearer for Voluntary Euthanasia14 
 
I appeal to visitors to my site if you have personal experience or have knowledge 
of a relative, a friend, or acquaintance in a similar situation to mine please 
provide details in either my guest book or send me an e-mail.  I want to collect as 
much evidence as I can to put under the noses of our politicians, and ask them 
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this question…”HOW MUCH LONGER WILL YOUR CONSCIENCES ALLOW 
YOU TO IGNORE THE PAIN AND SUFFERING OF A GROWING NUMBER OF 
THE CITIZENS YOU CLAIM TO REPRESENT.”15 (Emphasis in text) 
 
I made a promise to myself not to suffer another winter & shortly I will keep that 
promise. It is my life – my choice.16 
 
The dominant message of the web-diary is that it is her function to be an advocate for 
medically assisted suicide and legal sanction of euthanasia.  It is ironic that Crick 
proposed a change in Queensland law to permit medically assisted suicide or voluntary 
euthanasia based on independent diagnosis of terminal illness, when the person 
concerned was mentally stable and rational.17  Sources close to Crick acknowledged 
after her death that she was not suffering from a terminal illness in the usual sense of 
the term and claimed that she knew this about her health status.18  Van Gend cites 
Nancy’s physician and confidant, Philip Nitschke, maintaining that Crick’s medical 
condition was irrelevant to the decision to end her life.19  Syme presents evidence that 
Crick’s decision was made with no interference from her family or friends in support of 
his view that her decision was autonomous.20  Recently, Graham Downie has reflected 
that: 
In dying with dignity, as her supporters put it, she demonstrated the need for very 
sound medical and personal counsel for anyone concerned about a terminal 
illness.21 
 
While Crick agreed to delay her suicide until after her son’s birthday and 
granddaughter’s wedding,22 there is little evidence from her comments on these events 
that she was relationally engaged with the people or events.  This stands in stark 
contrast to her eager anticipation of the euthanasia rally held on March 25, 2002 – the 
day after her granddaughter’s wedding.23  
 
A nuanced relational approach to Crick’s situation would appreciate the limitations to 
relationality already sedimented in her life.  Previous choices and relationships, 
ingrained patterns in physical, psychological and sociological development, all have 
their effect.  But these need not close off the opportunity for further development.  Some 
relationships are inherently asymmetrical, as between parent and child, doctor and 
patient, teacher and student, employer and employee.  Levinas recognised that such 
asymmetry was a feature of all human dialogical encounters.  Problems arise not from 
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this inherent asymmetry but when the weaker partner is so objectified as to not be a 
subject of communication.  To be, in fact, rejected. 
 
I would suggest, then, that those who became significant to Nancy Crick in her last year 
were not genuine dialogue partners, but rather echoed back to her the judgment of the 
worthlessness of her life.  The point of contention in her decision was not ultimately 
euthanasia or medically assisted suicide, but her medical condition of not being 
terminally ill and probably able to be cured; hence, not a candidate for either option as 
presently proposed, at least in Australia.  Crick’s plea was for someone to provide her 
with a relatively certain means to end her life (sodium pentobarbital-Nembutal-being her 
preference), and to have people with her when she died.24  Those publicly supporting 
her decision made it clear that what they supported was the autonomous decision to 
end life whenever a person chose to do so, regardless of their state of health and 
possibilities of cure.25  Crick herself recorded in her diary that postponing her 
announced date of death led to a number of pro-euthanasia advocates criticising her 
personally, while the euthanasia advocate handling the media for her was more 
concerned with protecting euthanasia organisations than with Crick.26  By her own 
account, she felt that she was the object of a monological communication in her last 
year.  Her relations with physicians trying to introduce a range of options for her were 
rejected—in favour of those who endorsed the position that she had arrived at: her 
major contribution to the world would be to challenge existing laws by ending her life. 
 
Concerning euthanasia, the traditional moral-theological approach argues that such an 
act is morally wrong due to the deliberate intention of terminating the life of an innocent 
person (even if carried out at their own request).  Such an approach is helpful when it is 
possible to clearly delineate between life and death, ordinary means of health care and 
extraordinary means, terminal conditions and temporary lapses in health.  In an era of 
advanced medical technology, it is no longer always clear how this moral norm 
operates.  Are all acts deriving from an intention to end life to be considered 
euthanasia?  Opinion on this varies, with some thinkers arguing that all acts which result 
in death where the activity undertaken directly causes death are equivalent to 
euthanasia.  This perspective would hold that discontinuation of life-support equipment, 
the cessation of nutrition and hydration, or even some forms of pain relief are all morally 
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equivalent to euthanasia.  Others argue that the distinction between intending to kill and 
taking a course of action which results in death is of moral significance. 
 
Peter Singer, for example, has argued that appeals to the principle of “double effect”,27 
and distinguishing between ordinary and extraordinary means28 obfuscate the genuine 
moral issues.  The principle of double effect was the central defining principle of 
Catholic medical ethics prior to the Second Vatican Council.29  It is specifically designed 
to deal with a range of health care procedures where there are both good and bad 
effects flowing from a proposed action, for example, where physicians administer high 
doses of analgesia where the intention is pain relief, even when it is known that the 
dosage will hasten the patient’s death.   
 
The distinction between ordinary and extraordinary means of health care refers to 
situations in which patients, their families and carers can make a decision to forego 
treatments which will prolong life but where the treatment is no longer beneficial to the 
patient in any meaningful sense.30  In contemporary health care practice, this distinction 
has lead to the cessation of nutrition and hydration of terminally ill patients.  Singer 
argues that the choices made in such situations are tacitly, if not openly, choices 
designed to bring about the death of the patient; and that most people believe that the 
death of the patient in such circumstances is the correct outcome.31  He suggests that it 
would be more honest and practical to simply acknowledge that the root intention is to 
ease suffering by bringing about death.32 
 
In defence of these principles—double effect and the distinction between ordinary and 
extraordinary means—Luke Gormally points to an important distinction between 
“intention” and “foreseen causation of death”.33  Intentionally causing the death of a 
person, that is, choosing a course of action designed to bring about death, is always 
wrong; it is incompatible with human dignity.  But this does not rule out all medical 
decisions which could lead to death.  The foreseen causation of death can be 
compatible with human dignity; nor does it shape the fundamental moral disposition of 
the agent as the intention to kill must.  Acting intentionally to cause the death of another 
is, as Levinas would argue, an instance of the ultimate negation of the other.   
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The case of Terri Schiavo demonstrates how strict legal interpretations of relationships 
are inadequate and may even enshrine rejection of the Other.  A major feature of the 
Schiavo case is that the primary relationships of which Terri Schiavo was part, her 
marital relationship with husband Michael and her relationships with her biological 
family, parents and siblings, were not in agreement about the decision.  That is, her 
biological family wanted nutrition and hydration to continue, it was her husband who 
conducted the legal battle and made the decision to withdraw treatment, with court 
orders to enforce his determination.  It should be noted that while definitive diagnosis of 
the extent of brain damage was limited, there was medical consensus that given the 
severity of the damage and the length of time which had elapsed, Schiavo had little 
chance of recovery, in the sense of a return to her previous life or even substantial 
improvement.  An autopsy confirmed this diagnosis and also that many of the claims of 
her parents about “eye-tracking” (following movement) and some spontaneous eating 
when offered food, were highly unlikely to be accurate.34 
 
The scenario then is this: a severely compromised and damaged patient who requires 
artificial means of nutrition and hydration to maintain biological life, but who is not 
terminally ill, nor likely to die from anything other than dehydration or starvation.  Her 
husband believes that her quality of life is insufficient to warrant ongoing care; her 
parents and siblings dispute this claim.  The courts consistently determine that her 
husband has the legal power to make decisions about her ongoing care.  There are 
many controversies in this case concerning alleged physical abuse by the husband, 
money from a malpractice suit and the validity of conflicting medical opinions.  Two 
aspects of this case are instructive for our purposes.  Firstly, the legal determination that 
adult relationships which are chosen and have legal standing–-marriage, for instance–-
should take priority over biological relationships.  Secondly, that the law is not a 
particularly sound arbiter of the reality of relationships. 
 
In relation to the first matter, the courts recognised that being in relationship to the 
patient brings a responsibility, even duty, to make decisions on behalf of the vulnerable 
incapacitated patient.  Clearly this is a stance which, drawing on Levinas, I argue should 
be supported in a prima facie sense.  Interpersonal relationships do bring such 
responsibility and when the relationship is chosen and serious, and of long-standing, as 
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in marriage, it should take a certain priority over other relationships, even familial 
relations.  This is should not be an unlimited priority, however.  I believe that the courts 
made a formal determination in this case based on a legal reality which was predicated 
on a fictional relationship. 
 
At the time of her original collapse and injury, Schiavo and her husband were married 
and there is no serious evidence to suggest that it was not a genuine relationship in that 
Terri Schiavo was, at the time, undergoing treatment to achieve pregnancy.  However, 
by the time of the final court decisions in this case, the husband Michael was in a de 
facto relationship of long standing—about eight years—with two children from that 
relationship.35  Whether, as has been alleged, he wanted to cease treatment in order to 
preserve the monetary award for malpractice given for Terri’s ongoing care for his own 
use is irrelevant to my argument.  The point is that he had made decisions which 
repudiated the level and kind of relationship which the courts were maintaining still 
existed due to the fact the couple had never divorced.  There might be a number of 
reasons why Michael Schiavo decided not to divorce Terri Schiavo.  It is reasonable, 
however, to assume that had she returned to consciousness, Terri may have viewed 
her husband’s adultery and two children from this relationship as grounds for her to 
divorce him! 
 
The distinctions in this case are not only due to the medical circumstances but also due 
to the relational circumstances.  In the Schiavo case the people in the two major 
relationships of her life, her parents and her husband, fundamentally disagreed over the 
value of the medical prognosis, what it meant for Terri to be maintained in her current 
health state and over who should make such decisions.  While the marriage continued 
legally, no reasonable observer would believe that Michael Schiavo’s primary 
relationship was with his legal wife and not with his de facto wife and children. 
 
A relational perspective would have taken this real set of relationships into account, and 
pointed out that the husband’s claims of duty and responsibility for his wife were, at 
least, compromised.  The overriding value of the sanctity of life cannot absolutely 
depend on whether or not a supposedly legal marriage must take precedence over 
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other relationships.  Instead of looking to who had the patient’s best interests in mind, 
the legal decision turned on very narrow legal definitions. 
 
A Practical Theology of Health Care 
A practical theology of health care based on relationality contests decisions about life 
based on rigid and abstract determinations of either a legal or biological character.  The 
moral discernment it envisages presupposes an unfolding search for meaning within an 
ultimate and theological conviction of human destiny as sharing in the very life of God.  
While such a conviction does not offer a ready solution to all moral dilemmas, it does 
highlight the value of the relationality in which all persons exist.  This relational context 
is preferable to an exclusive focus on the morality of a particular isolated act.  It also 
provides a basis for refuting Peter Singer’s claim that people have given up on the 
sanctity of life in all but name.  Only a relational context can provide a sufficient basis to 
uphold moral ideals and make sense of concrete decision-making in such cases.  In 
these end-of-life cases a relation-based analysis highlights a much stronger and clearer 
sense of who should be responsible for decision-making.  In situations where a number 
of different relational perspectives can achieve consensus in support of a particular well-
founded medical position, a more ethical outcome is likely.  In situations of significant 
dispute between the parties it is unlikely that the outcome will be ethical, even if 
warranted legally and medically.   
 
In the Schiavo case, however, the different reasoning process would have highlighted a 
number of flaws in using the legal system to arrive at moral decisions.  In this case the 
courts upheld a decision based on the legal marriage of Terri and Michael Schiavo even 
though the relationship, as marriage, had been effectively repudiated and for a number 
of years.  While Terri Schiavo was in care for fifteen years, it is clear that her legal 
husband was, in fact, in another marriage for at least half that time.  An analysis of the 
case based on relational personhood would have taken into account other relationships 
as well as the marital relationship equally, coming to a conclusion that weighed their 
competing claims more validly based on actual relationship rather than just a legal 
definition of relationship.  For Nancy Crick, a relational analysis would have suggested 
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that her sense of isolation and refusal to accept most medical advice might have more 
in common than has been highlighted in public discussion of the case.   
 
Such a physical description of relationships savours of a clinical detachment foreign to 
the language of relationship.  Yet this objectification and sterilization of the language of 
relation makes possible the rejection of the other in a radical manner.36  Here, there are 
two levels to be considered.  On the objective level, the relationship can be considered 
in a purely physical fashion, with its various biological and clinical components.  On the 
subjective level, the relationship implies recognition of the other in a more personal 
manner, as this other is given, inviting in its otherness to enter unreservedly into the 
relationship which already exists, through further choices and continuing commitment.  
A moral space is opened up in which new identities are formed and flourish within an 
inter-subjective community.  This kind of space, identity and interdisciplinary 
approaches to community are properly the focus of practical theology.  
 
Applied in the context of health care, relational anthropology demands recognition of the 
fact that patients are not pathologies or disabilities or conditions, they are persons-in-
relation.  This recognition, in turn, demands a paradigm shift in health care away from a 
pathological focus to one focused on human health as a means to achieve the optimal 
flourishing of persons.  Within such an altered paradigm someone like Nancy Crick 
would be supported in her health condition and challenged to accept that a return to 
health or at least an optimal level of health for her age and medical history was 
possible.  Those who joined with Crick to advocate her death would be challenged 
about their own anthropologies and agendas.   
 
A theology of relational personhood generates a very different model of health care and 
a very different health care ethic.  Conceptualising persons relationally shifts the primary 
task of health care from pathology to the care of persons.  This transformation involves 
risks for health care professionals because relationality demands that the person who is 
a health care professional invite relationship with patients and be open to relational 
encounters.  Ebracing the Other involves opening the self to risk; it necessarily, this will 
cause professionals to be more open to the pain and the suffering of the Other.  This is 
the consequence of moving beyond the comfortable boundaries of a functional repair 
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model of medicine to a model of health care which is genuinely able to effect 
transformation in the lives of those involved in health care.  The need for such openness 
to transformative possibilities is demanded both by the nature of persons and by the 
nature of health care.  The latter has a focus on human flourishing not just cure of 
illness; this cannot happen unless the transformation of persons is encouraged.  Such 
transformation is invited and demanded by the face of the Other in the clinical 
encounter.  These cases demonstrate the importance of relational anthropologies in 
offering models for thinking and a means of discernment of how to proceed. 
 
Relational personhood provides a quite different grounding for analysis of concrete 
cases in health care ethics.  Instead of attempting to start from an objective calculus or 
ethical principles approach, whereby a set of pre-determined standards are applied to a 
given case, regardless of context, utilizing a relational perspective requires that the 
analysis occurs from the viewpoint of the subject.  In this context the subject is not 
primarily an individual but a person-in-relation and, therefore, their relationships are a 
vital part of the analysis.  Such a focus means that physicians and ethicists involved in a 
case such as Nancy Crick’s for example, do not have to endorse and/or carry out her 
request to die simply on the basis of an emphasis on autonomy constructed as the 
rational request of an individual.  Rather, a relational health care ethic adopts a broader 
set of criteria.   
 
The relationships which became significant to Nancy Crick in the last year of her life 
were those that endorsed her desire to end her life.  They championed the idea that an 
individual should be able to request medical intervention to end their life in the case of 
terminal illness and an unwillingness to continue treatment.  No relationship which 
argued a contrary position was accepted as meaningful.  This seems decidedly odd.  A 
group of people who are virtual strangers or who have only been known for a brief 
period of time are taken on as “dialogue” partners but close members of her family are 
not.  From the description of her life in the diary, a reasonable person might conclude 
that Crick’s family neglected her, perhaps prompting a turn to strangers and an 
articulation of a desire to die.  Her acquaintances who supported a bid to end life on the 
basis of a single choice are embraced; but those who argue for life, choices and options 
are rejected.  The value of empirical evidence was denied, while erroneous 
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assumptions about Crick’s health status were uncritically accepted.  These 
circumstances would suggest that the claim of rationality in the case of Nancy Crick is 
misplaced.  The conception of the autonomous rational person relies on an 
understanding of reason as meeting objective criteria and being subject to public 
scrutiny.  While it might be plausible that Crick’s desire to forego burdensome and futile 
treatment is understood and endorsed widely as a rational desire, it is unlikely that the 
same endorsement can be made in the light of the medical evidence: Crick was not 
terminally ill, she was presented with a range of treatment options which were all 
standard for her situation – she rejected all views which did not coincide with her own.  
 
Attention to her relational circumstances would have yielded a different analysis: it 
would have highlighted that meaningful primary relationships were lacking in her life, 
leaving her vulnerable to expedient relationships – ones where her personhood was 
neither affirmed nor promoted.  Crick was vulnerable and instead of her needs being 
met by those with whom she was in relationship, her vulnerability was being exploited 
by people who viewed her as a means to an end. 
 
This analysis demonstrates why the notion of relational personhood represents a 
necessary ingredient in health care: not only is the analysis of particular cases different, 
but in order for the health outcomes to change it is necessary to alter the structures 
within health care delivery to enable relational analyses to be acted on.  Nancy Crick’s 
distorted perspective about her health condition could not ultimately be challenged by 
health professionals due to the dominance of the concept of patient autonomy and 
wariness about the dangers of medical paternalism.  The focus on patient autonomy in 
cases concerning euthanasia and assisted suicide is counter-productive since any 
analysis is too tightly constrained by pre-determined criteria and unable to take 
sufficient account of subject-specific issues.37 
 
While it is difficult, even in well publicised cases such as this, for one to propose a 
precise course of action, one feature of the case does offer scope to suggest a more 
relational approach.  Based on Crick’s web diary, the writings of health care 
professionals and commentators at the time of her death, it appears that no medical 
consultations were held with a wider group of people than Crick herself.  As noted 
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above, she appears to have had a distant or tenuous relationship with her children.  Had 
her children, and even grandchildren, been included in discussions about her health 
status and prognosis Crick may have received a different range of support and/or 
advice.  Had Crick’s treating physicians been able to take into account the nature of 
women’s relationships with their families and associated features of depression, 
poverty, vulnerability and poor social support,38 then they may have had a wider range 
of options open to them and Crick may well have found other solutions to her situation. 
 
Had her supporters in the voluntary euthanasia movement been aware that her health 
condition did not meet the criteria for terminal illness, it may be that they would have 
proposed a different course of action, since it was reasonably predictable that the public 
sympathy which is often aroused in cases where the terminally ill want to die would not 
be forthcoming in a situation where a person refused all advice, treatment and 
assistance.  In reaction to the announcement that Nancy Crick had not been terminally 
ill the Australian community significantly reduced support for voluntary euthanasia, even 
if only on a temporary basis.39  At the very least, as David van Gend argues, any 
discussion of euthanasia and/or assisted suicide needs to take account of “the grim 
nature of some family relationships.”  He goes on to cite a House of Lords decision to 
reject assisted suicide/euthanasia on the grounds that “[W]e are concerned that 
vulnerable people – the elderly, lonely, sick or distressed – would feel pressure, whether 
real or imagined, to seek early death.”40 
 
Conclusion 
A relational theology recognises the patient as one who suffers and who is “other” in a 
manner that transcends the projections or field of competence of the professional carer.  
This is to say that the patient is a person—with the totality of relationships and values 
involved in such a status; therefore, not just a pathological object. 
 
At one level, it is impossible not to recognise that another person is other.  Yet this 
commanding alterity is muted by the effort to classify people into manageable 
groupings—such as nationality, ethnic origin, complexion, financial resources, or by 
type of illness, health status, disability and trauma.  Such classifications are clearly a 
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pragmatic necessity.  But these kinds of categorisations are not designed to appreciate 
the individuality of each case and uniqueness of each person.  Taken to an extreme 
classifications based on pathology or ethnic origin have resulted in horrendous 
atrocities: to be negatively “classified” has meant being dehumanised or even 
demonised, with all semblance of personhood excluded.  Levinas’ approach to the other 
as calling the ego into moral responsibility, expressed in the biblical command, “Thou 
shalt not kill”, is especially poignant in the health care context.  
 
While theology is rightly focused on the reciprocity of relationships between the divine 
and the human, it just as rightly maintains that there is no simple symmetry between the 
human way of relating to God, and the God’s way of relating to the human.  God is 
always the infinitely Other, never a projection of human need nor an object of human 
manipulation.  Person(s) in the divine sense are never reducible to the human concept 
of self.  This transcendent sense of otherness or alterity is analogically applicable to the 
love and care existing between human subjects: the ultimate otherness of the human 
person is found in its origin and destiny in God.  If such personal alterity is not 
respected—in health care and in social relationships and services—a distortion enters 
into relationships concerned: the “other”—in its inexpressible uniqueness and 
transcendent destiny—is reduced to the “same”, as, say, a projection of “my” needs or 
concern or as even as an object of “my” care: the unique “you” becomes merely an 
extension of “me”.  The cases of Nancy Crick and Terri Schiavo demonstrate the 
dangers when health care allows such distortion to be commonplace.  On the other 
hand, by recognising the otherness of an individual, particularly in a situation of 
suffering, we are faced with the appealing vulnerability of the other, and the inescapable 
fact of our own vulnerability as well.  A relational perspective may not have altered the 
outcomes for either Nancy Crick or Terri Schiavo – but it would have altered the way the 
cases were understood and, perhaps, the perspectives which were brought to bear on 
the people whose lives were at stake.  Certainly they would have called attention to the 
radical nature of their Otherness. 
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